Reinfection with SARS-CoV-2 : discrete SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) modeling using empirical infection data by McMahon, Andrew & Robb, Nicole C.
Original Paper
Reinfection with SARS-CoV-2: Discrete SIR (Susceptible, Infected,
Recovered) Modeling Using Empirical Infection Data
Andrew McMahon1, BA, MSci; Nicole C Robb1,2, BSc, DPhil
1Department of Physics, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
2Warwick Medical School, University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:









Background: The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, which causes the COVID-19 disease, has resulted in a global pandemic.
Since its emergence in December 2019, the virus has infected millions of people, caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands,
and resulted in incalculable social and economic damage. Understanding the infectivity and transmission dynamics of the virus
is essential to determine how best to reduce mortality while ensuring minimal social restrictions on the lives of the general
population. Anecdotal evidence is available, but detailed studies have not yet revealed whether infection with the virus results in
immunity.
Objective: The objective of this study was to use mathematical modeling to investigate the reinfection frequency of COVID-19.
Methods: We have used the SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) framework and random processing based on empirical
SARS-CoV-2 infection and fatality data from different regions to calculate the number of reinfections that would be expected to
occur if no immunity to the disease occurred.
Results: Our model predicts that cases of reinfection should have been observed by now if primary SARS-CoV-2 infection did
not protect individuals from subsequent exposure in the short term; however, no such cases have been documented.
Conclusions: This work concludes that infection with SARS-CoV-2 provides short-term immunity to reinfection and therefore
offers useful insight for serological testing strategies, lockdown easing, and vaccine development.
(JMIR Public Health Surveill 2020;6(4):e21168) doi: 10.2196/21168
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Introduction
The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 is thought to have
originated in China in late 2019, and has since spread globally,
resulting in the COVID-19 pandemic. In the 8 months since the
first confirmed case, the virus has resulted in 24 million
confirmed infections and over 820,000 deaths, and has caused
substantial social and economic damage.
SIR (Susceptible, Infected, Recovered) modeling uses a set of
differential equations to determine how the number of infected
and recovered individuals changes over time given a specified
rate of infection and recovery. It was first used in 1927 by
Kermack et al [1] and has since been used to model epidemics
from AIDS [2] to SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome)
[3]. Variations of SIR modeling have been used during the
COVID-19 pandemic to look at the varying burden on health
care systems based on public health intervention [4], the absence
of a stable disease-free equilibrium [5], and infection rate [6],
as well as the eventual size of the overall pandemic [7]. An
extension of the model has also been used to simulate the
changing death rate as a function of the number of individuals
infected, and it was found that an equilibrium point was reached
where there were no further reinfections [8].
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In this study, we used an extension to the SIR framework that
distinguished between infected and reinfected individuals to
model empirical data taken from a compiled COVID-19 data
set [9], in order to investigate the reinfection frequency of the
disease. We aimed to determine if cases classified as
“reinfections” will occur, although to date there is no definitive
cases of reinfection reported in the scientific literature.
Methods
Data Sources
We used national infection and mortality data from a variety of
sources to investigate the reinfection dynamics of SARS-CoV-2.
Unless specified, national data on infections and deaths from
SARS-CoV-2 were acquired from the Our World in Data
database compiled by the Oxford Martin School at the
University of Oxford [9]; the hospitalization cases in
Switzerland were obtained from the Federal Office of Public
Health in Switzerland [10]; the data for the city of New York
were obtained from the New York City Health website [11];
the population of New York City was obtained from the 2019
New York census [12]; and the recovery data for Germany was
sourced from Trading Economics [13], which obtains its data
from the World Health Organization (WHO). For each
geographical region, the data were taken from the date of the
first recorded infection up until May 17, 2020, when the data
were accessed.
Choice of Geographical Regions
The simulations were initially completed for the United
Kingdom, where, at the time the data were accessed, there was
a high number of confirmed cases. Australia was selected as an
example of a region with low numbers of recorded cases, in
order to investigate the limit of expected reinfections; Germany
was selected as it was one of the few countries with recorded
recovery data; Italy was studied since the number of infections
and deaths had peaked by May 17, 2020; Singapore was unique
as a city-state so population density for the nation was very
high; Switzerland was selected since hospitalization data were
available at the time the data were accessed; and the United
States as a whole was compared with New York City, which
was the worst affected part of the United States at the time.
Assumptions
A number of assumptions have been made. Where possible,
they have been made so that the number of reinfections is
underestimated. These assumptions are as follows:
1. There is a large lag time for recovery to take place (28 days)
[14,15].
2. The incubation period was modeled as 6 days [16].
3. The model does not consider social distancing or shielding
and so assigns an equal probability of an infection to all
individuals.
4. Not all infections have been recorded due to lack of testing,
misdiagnosis, or asymptomatic infection [17].
5. Infections and recoveries are not necessarily recorded on
the date that they first occurred.
6. There is no emigration out of, or immigration into, a
population of interest.
7. The model assumes a homogeneous population density,
with no societal structure (eg, equal number of residents
per household).
The Model
We based our model on the compartmental SIR framework, but
differentiated between initial and subsequent infections, resulting
in a 6-state model (susceptible, infected, recovered, infected [2
or more times], recovered [2 or more times], and deceased)
(Figure 1 and Table 1). The number of infections and deaths
each day was taken from national statistics (as described above).
Where available, recovery data were used; otherwise, recoveries
were modeled with a 28-day lag time (with the number of
recoveries representing those individuals who did not die during
the 28-day recovery time). “Recovered” individuals were
selected stochastically from the populations of the states 28
days prior [14,15], “infected” individuals from the populations
of the states 6 days prior (due to the incubation period [16]),
and “deceased” individuals from the populations of the states
1 day prior.
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Figure 1. A simple representation of the model. St represents the number of persons susceptible to infection who have had no prior infections on day
t; It is the number of people currently infected for the first time on day t; Rt is the number of people who have recovered once on day t; I’t is the number
of people who have been infected 2 or more times and are infected on day t; R’t is the number of people who have recovered 2 or more times and are
not infected on day t of the model, and Dt is the number of deceased persons on day t of the model. Further symbols are defined in Table 1.
Table 1. Definition of parameters in the model.
DefinitionParameter
Random numberxi
The number of days into the simulation; t=1 for the day of the first infectiont
The average number of days for recovery (trecovery=28)trecovery
The average number of days before an infection is seen (tincubation=6)tincubation = tinc.
The number of days over which the simulation is runtmax
The number of susceptible individuals on day tSt
The number of infected (once) individuals on day tIt
The number of recovered (once) individuals on day tRt
The number of infected (2 or more times) individuals on day tI’t
The number of recovered (2 or more times) individuals on day tR’t
The number of deceased individuals from SARS-CoV-2 on day tDt
The infection rate on day tΒt
The recovery rate on day tγ
The death rate on day tmt
The total population in the model; N = St + It + Rt + I’t + R’t + Dt ∀ tN
The number of infected individuals on day t; Nt
infected = It + I’tNt
infected
The number of uninfected individuals on day t; Nt
uninfected = St + Rt + R’tNt
uninfected
The number of new infections on day t; nt
infected = βtSt–tincubation(It–tincubation + I’t–tincubation) + βtRt–tincubation(It–tincubation +
I’t–tincubation) + βtR’t–tincubation(It–tincubation + I’t–tincubation)
nt
infected
The number of recovering individuals on day t; nt
recovered = γtIt–trecovery + γtI’t–trecoverynt
recovered
The number of deaths on day t; nt
deaths = mtIt–1 + mtI’t–1nt
deaths
The number of first-time infections on day t (ie, the number of St → It transitions on day t)it
first time
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When using the model, the rates of infection, recovery, and
fatality for each state were assumed to be independent of how
many infections a host had previously had. The number of
susceptible persons at the beginning of the simulation, N, was
taken to be the population of the region of interest [9,12]. After
all infections, recoveries, and deaths for a day, the number of
days into the simulation was increased by one, t → t + 1 up to
tmax. The simulation was repeated 10,000 times to produce
expectation values and standard deviations for the number of
individuals classified as reinfections.
By pooling the number of cases in the infected (2 or more times),
recovered (2 or more times), and deceased (after 2 or more
infections) states at the end of the simulation, we calculated an
estimate of the number of reinfections that would be expected
to occur. This number represents the total population that had
passed through the infected (2 or more times) state by the end
of the simulation.
Unless otherwise stated, the average recovery time used in the
simulations was set as 28 days, as this is greater than the median
recovery time suggested in the report of the WHO-China Joint
Mission on Coronavirus Disease 2019 [14].
Results
Simulations of UK Infection Data Suggest a Small
Number of Reinfections Should Have Occurred
We initially ran the simulation for data in the United Kingdom
over the course of 106 days (from the first recorded case on
February 1 until May 17, 2020, when the data were accessed).
Figure 2 shows how the population of each state in the model
changed over the course of a typical simulation. The number
of susceptible individuals initially remained steady, until day
55, when there was a sharp decline due to the increase in primary
infections (Figure 2A). The number of individuals infected just
once started to increase steadily after day 40 and continued to
do so throughout the simulation until day 92. After the 28-day
lag time, the individuals infected once started to recover,
resulting in an increase in the recovered (once) state through to
the end of the simulation (Figure 2B). As the number of
recovered individuals started to increase, so did the number of
people infected for a second time. The number of people
recovered for the second time started to increase after the 28-day
recovery lag time (Figure 2C). The number of deaths started to
rise from day 55 onwards, and fatalities continued to increase
through to the end of the simulation (Figure 2D). In the United
Kingdom, the number of expected reinfections was calculated
to be 43 (SD 7), which makes up 0.018% of the total infections
(Table 2). The first reinfection for the United Kingdom was on
day 82 (SD 5), corresponding to April 22, 2020.
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Figure 2. Plots of the populations of each state in the model over the course of a typical simulation, using infection data from the United Kingdom.
(A) An example plot of the susceptible population in the model over the course of 106 days (from the first recorded case on February 1 until May 17,
2020, when the data were accessed). (B) An example plot of the populations that are infected for the first time or recovered from a single infection. (C)
An example plot of the populations of the simulation that have been reinfected and have recovered from an infection twice. (D) An example plot of the
number of deceased individuals through the course of the simulation.
Table 2. The number of predicted reinfections and their standard deviation in different locations worldwide as predicted from the model. Unless
otherwise stated, these figures represent simulations using the total number of infections for each region and are modeled without the data on the number
of recoveries.
Reinfections as a % of the total infectionsInfections, NReinfections, mean (SD)Region
0.001470360.1 (0.3)Australia
0.011174,35520 (5)Germany
0.05174,35579 (9)Germany (with recovery data)
0.028224,76063 (8)Italy
0.11189,027209 (15)New York City
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Simulations of Infection Data in Other Regions Show
a Similar Trend
The simulations were repeated with data from Australia, Italy,
New York City, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United States.
The mean number of expected reinfections in each region or
country for the 10,000 simulations that were run are shown in
Table 2. In all cases, with the exception of Australia, our model
predicts that reinfection cases should occur.
Comparison of Infection and Hospitalization Data in
New York City
Next, we repeated our simulation for New York City, with the
total number of infections replaced by the number of
hospitalizations. When we ran the simulation with an input of
the total number of infections, the number of secondary
infections continued to increase throughout the simulation, when
the numbers appear to start to peak (Figure 3A). This was
followed by an increase in the number of secondary recoveries
after the 28-day recovery lag time. In comparison, the
hospitalization data for New York showed no secondary
recoveries as the reinfections occurred later into the simulation
(Figure 3B). The total number of predicted reinfections from
the New York hospitalized data was 12 (SD 4) (Table 2).
Figure 3. Comparison of total infections versus hospitalization data in New York City. Plots of the infected (2 or more times) and recovered (2 or more
times) states for (A) New York using all infection data and (B) New York using only the hospitalization data.
Inclusion of Recovery Data Suggests That Predicted
Reinfections Are Underestimated
Recovery data was sparse or unavailable for most regions, likely
due to lack of follow-up testing. Recovery data were available
from Germany, and we therefore compared the results of our
simulation for Germany with and without the recovery data as
an input. The models used a 28-day lag before the recoveries
started, meaning very few secondary recoveries took place
(Figure 4A and B). There were 73 more reinfections with the
reinfection data than with the modeled data (Table 2).
Figure 4. Plots of infected (2 or more times) and recovered (2 or more times) states with (A) modeled recovery data and (B) actual recovery data. Use
of actual recovery data from Germany suggests that the number of recovered individuals, and hence reinfections, are underestimated in our model.
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The 28-day lag time used for the modeled recovery data ensured
that we underestimated the recovery rate, and therefore the rate
of reinfection as well. To investigate a more life-like recovery
rate, the United Kingdom simulations were repeated again using
the modeled recovery data, while shortening the lag time for
recovery. As expected, we found that the rate of reinfection
increased as the lag time was decreased from 28 days through
to 7 days, as there was a larger population that recovered from
a primary infection. With a 7-day lag time, the number of people
in the infected (2 or more times) state peaked at day 101 of the
simulation (Multimedia Appendix 1). The total number of people
reinfected throughout the simulation increased as the lag time
decreased, with 43 (SD 7), 83 (SD 9), 139 (SD 12), and 209
(SD 14) reinfections for 28-day, 21-day, 14-day, and 7-day
recovery lag times, respectively.
Discussion
In this work, we have presented a modeling strategy used to
determine whether SARS-CoV-2 reinfections can occur. We
modeled actual infection and fatality data from different regions
around the world and found that all regions investigated, with
the exception of Australia, should have recorded cases of
reinfections if primary infection with SARS-CoV-2 did not
provide some level of immunity. The actual number of cases
of reinfection that have been reported in any of these regions
or countries to date is zero, suggesting that worldwide, primary
SARS-CoV-2 infection provides short-term immunity.
In Australia, the number of confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infections
at the time the data were accessed was relatively low [9],
possibly due to early social distancing measures, the closing of
international borders, and mass testing and tracing measures.
The number of modeled reinfections (0.1 [SD 0.3]; Table 2)
reflects this, and so even without immunity from infection no
reinfections would be expected to occur. Similarly, in
Switzerland and Singapore, very low numbers of reinfections
were predicted by the model (6.2 [SD 2.5] and 6 [SD 2],
respectively; Table 2). It is possible that these very low numbers
of reinfection cases could have been missed due to misdiagnosis
or lack of follow-up testing. We therefore applied our model to
data from Germany [9], Italy [9], New York City [11,12], and
the United States as a whole [9], which have recorded far higher
numbers of SARS-CoV-2 infections (174,355; 224,760;
189,027; and 1,467,884, respectively, when the data were
accessed). The number of reinfection cases predicted for these
countries was 30 (SD 6), 89 (SD 9), 335 (SD 18), and 635 (SD
25) for Germany, Italy, New York, and the United States,
respectively (Table 2). We conclude that it is therefore very
unlikely that all of these predicted cases, if true, were missed
due to misdiagnosis or lack of testing.
We also found that rehospitalization cases should have been
seen amongst hospitalized cases in New York City—it is
unlikely that these cases would be missed as people are
processed and tested on admission into hospital. To date,
however, no reinfections have verifiably been recorded
anywhere in the world. A report from South Korea suggested
that 116 patients recovered from COVID-19 had tested positive
by RT-PCR (reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction)
for the virus again [18]; however, this has since been explained
as the “false-positive” detection of remnants of viral RNA
(ribonucleic acid) rather than reactivation or reinfection. The
lack of documented reinfections suggests that short-term
immunity to the virus is produced by an initial infection,
although our model cannot predict whether this immunity will
last over longer timescales.
Our results are supported by a number of animal challenge
studies, which also show that immunity to SARS-CoV-2 can
be conferred. A study in rhesus macaques showed that, following
initial viral clearance, the monkeys showed a reduction in their
median viral load in comparison with primary infection when
rechallenged with SARS-CoV-2 [19]. Similarly, Ryan et al [20]
demonstrated that rechallenged ferrets were fully protected from
acute lung pathology. An adenovirus-vector vaccine tested on
rhesus macaques elicited a humoral and cellular response that,
on challenge with the virus, proved to significantly reduce the
viral load in bronchoalveolar lavage fluid and respiratory tract
tissue [21]. However, a longitudinal study by Seow et al [22]
showed that the immunity conferred against SARS-CoV-2 may
only be short term. Our model proposes that reinfection cases
should have already started to appear by April 2020, suggesting
a possible lower limit for immunity duration.
A report from the WHO-China Joint Mission on Coronavirus
Disease 2019 estimated the recovery time for SARS-CoV-2
infection to be 2 weeks for mild cases and 3-6 weeks for severe
or critical cases [14]; based on this we used a long (28 days)
recovery lag time in the modeled data. Comparison with
real-world recovery data from Germany suggested that the actual
recovery time may be significantly shorter, giving rise to an
underestimation of the reinfection rate in our modeled data.
This was supported by an increase in the number of predicted
reinfections in the UK simulations when we used a shorter
recovery lag time of 7, 14, or 21 days. In addition, there were
no allowances in our model for transmission being localized to
regions smaller than a nation or city; the daily infection data
were likely to be only a fraction of the total number of infections
due to asymptomatic or mild infections not being recorded, and
infections were recorded on the date of testing, not the actual
date of infection. We also note that significant differences in
testing, reporting, and shielding of the vulnerable exist between
the different regions in this study and that a large number of
COVID-19 cases were missed in every region of interest (eg,
in Geneva, unreported cases were estimated to be 11.6 infections
per reported infection from April 6 to May 9 [17]). In every
region, we expect that the impact on our simulation would be
to underestimate the number of reinfections. Taken together,
this suggests that the actual reinfection rate would be
significantly higher than that predicted by our model if there
was no immunity conferred by prior infection.
Our model has a number of limitations, including the lack of
modeling of any social structure, the fact that individuals who
have been infected may change their shielding behaviors,
differing recovery times from person to person, and missing
information regarding immigration into and out of regions of
interest. In spite of this, the results documented here provide
strong evidence, based on real data, to suggest that that there is
at least short-term immunity conferred by an initial infection
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of SARS-CoV-2. This has implications for serological testing
strategies, lockdown easing timescales, and vaccine
development. Our modeling strategy can also be extended to
understand the reinfection dynamics of future pandemics.
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Plots of infected (2 or more times) and recovered (2 or more times) populations in the United Kingdom when the lag time used
was (A) 28 days, (B) 21 days, (C) 14 days, and (D) 7 days. Use of lower recovery lag times leads to an increase in the number
of expected reinfections.
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